NAVY/MARINE CORPS TACAIR INTEGRATION PLAN: TRANSFORMATION OR REORGANIZATION. FOR THE MARINE CORPS IT'S THE STOVL IMPERATIVE
The 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed the Department of the Navy (DoN) to:
"… Conduct a comprehensive review to assess the feasibility of integrating all Naval Aviation force structure. Naval Aviation force structure must continue to be flexible, responsive, interoperable, and expeditionary forces that support the Combatant Commanders and joint forces. The integration of aviation capabilities should seek both effectiveness and efficiencies."
A study was co-sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to investigate Tactical Aviation (TacAir) integration feasibility and to further determine if efficiencies gained would "translate into a reduction of projected APN-1
expenditures." 1 Upon completion of the study and a comprehensive internal review conducted by both the Navy and the Marine Corps, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), the CMC and the CNO "to begin the process of achieving integration of naval tactical aviation." (JSF) programs. 4 Additionally, most of the airframes and missions of TacAir in the Navy and Marine Corps are closely related or even interchangeable.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS OF INTEGRATION
The expected results of the currently accepted TacAir Integration Plan will be the very efficient use of all available assets through the seamless integration of operational Navy and Marine TacAir squadrons into both services' deployment programs. The MOU's vision is a more effective, lethal, cohesive and affordable Naval fighting force.
The efficiency of seamless integration will theoretically allow for a reduction in total TacAir squadrons within the DoN. Additional savings are proposed through the reduction in Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) 5 . PAA reduction is made possible due to the introduction of the JSF and the increased reliability and lethality it will provide. The proposals could save the DoN close to 35 billion dollars over the next 16-17 years.
Marine Corps TacAir has been the subject of intense scrutiny following every Major
Theater War or military budget crunch during the last six decades. Although not being directly assailed during this review, the Marine Corps must continue to clearly articulate the value of Marine TacAir as a separate naval aviation entity and show how it effectively supports evolving Naval Operating Concepts within the limitations of the expected budget allocation.
Although the proposed integration plan is efficient and certainly cheaper, it raises just as many questions as it answers. Will the plan meet the operational needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps? How will the procurement of two JSF variants work into the final plan? Are there alternatives that will stay within the given fiscal constraints, better meet the specific needs of each service, and better serve both the MAGTF commander and Regional Supported
Combatant Commander?
HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE OF INTEGRATION
The Continental Congress established the United States Navy on 13 October 1775. Just a few weeks later, on 10 November 1775, a resolution was passed stating "two battalions of
Marines be raised" as landing forces for the fleet. Since the days of their inception, the Navy (dollars to buy airframes).
Two major assumptions were made when planning the makeup of the future force against budget constraints. First, the budget should remain relatively stable but certainly no significant increases could be expected. Second, the major deployment commitments for both services will continue as currently projected. To eliminate the bow wave and make the long-term programs fiscally possible, several possibilities were examined: (1) disestablish squadrons, (2) reduce the number of aircraft per squadron, (3) reduce the number of non-deploying (overhead) aircraft (pipeline, training squadrons, test and evaluation…), (4) increase the level of integration between the services.
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THE PROPOSED INTEGRATION PLAN
The MOU, signed by the SecNav, CNO and the CMC resulted in a more detailed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the Service Deputies just days later. "Naval Aviation force projection will be accomplished by the increased integration of Marine Corps TacAir squadrons into Carrier Air Wings and the integration of Navy squadrons into Marine Aircraft Wings." 9 The specifics of the MOA include: retain (14) active Marine F/A-18 and (7) active AV-8B squadrons (no change), integrate (6) occurs during the inter-deployment period.
In the worse case scenario, a unit will chop OPCON to a deploying headquarters 9 months prior to a deployment. After completing pre-deployment workups that involve a significant amount of time at sea, the composite unit 17 deploys for six to seven months. Upon return, the composite unit maintains a ready status for real world contingency commitments for 1 month prior to releasing subordinate units back to their parent commands for the interdeployment period. This accounts for 17 months of an 18-month cycle. Units then replace approximately 30% of their personnel and prepare to chop back to a deploying headquarters for pre-deployment training within 30 days of being released from the previous deployment commitment.
The 3:1 unit to deployment ratio construct is considered the minimum for fundamental reasons. Even under ideal conditions, the inter-deployment training period is still less than 90 days which does not provide a unit adequate time to organize and train to maintain a sustainable experience base for continued rotational deployments. Something other than a 3:1 ratio, and probably closer to a 4:1 ratio, is required to ensure a safe, effective and sustainable force.
PEACETIME COMMITMENTS
The Navy and the Marine Corps will continue to focus on maintaining adequate forces to meet their global presence requirements. During peacetime operations, the Navy's and Marine The continual chopping and reintegrating of detachments is a disruptive event for a unit.
Within three months of reintegrating a returning detachment from a MEU (SOC), an AV-8Harrier squadron must send the next detachment back to another MEU. The pilots and maintenance personnel you detach to the MEU have been the heart of the squadron for the last 18 months but are required to give the deploying detachment the qualifications and certifications it requires.
What remains of the squadron (-) will reintegrate with the returning detachment after the normal post deployment personnel movements. The squadron commanding officer then begins to build and train the new team which will comprise the next MEU detachment. With the integration of the JSF, it would be very beneficial to restructure the squadrons to deploy as units with a normal inter-deployment training cycle.
THE SEA BASE AND SEA BASING
The next generation CV, as mentioned earlier, will have basically the same design characteristics and size and will be capable of carrying a comparable number of tail hook (non- When the improved capabilities of the future amphibious task force are looked at on the macro scale it is evident that the vision of the future amphibious force includes the ability to operate and sustain a robust rotary wing and STOVL fixed-wing Aviation Combat Element. This robust force will be required to support the MAGTF commander as the amphibious sea-base continues to grow in importance.
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
With improvements in ballistic missile technology and the political uncertainty associated with many parts of the world, deploying units to major fixed airbases may be militarily risky or politically unacceptable. Future enemies will strive to make the use of ports and major airfields untenable. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that even friendly democracies may chose to deny US forces access on or through their sovereign territory due to internal political concerns or disagreement over the U.S. policy. Marine Corps STOVL TacAir may be the only tactical air assets the MAGTF commander will have available under his operational control.
Joint Publication 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces states:
The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground combat elemental.
The Marine Corps has maintained this special relationship between its ground and air forces Prior to any squadron decommissioning occurring, the final JSF mix needs to be finalized to ensure the Marine Corps will not be forced to support CV deployments at the expense of it's MAGTF requirements.
RECOMMENDATION
The Navy and Marine Corps have a very successful and close working relationship and there is no doubt that this relationship should and will continue. The TacAir Integration Plan, as it is currently written, will lock each Service into an inflexible plan that creates winners and Corps would gain six squadrons through restructuring but should be able to source the squadrons from the same procurement plan. The Marine Corps would stand down one additional reserve squadron due to the additional flexibility to handle contingencies with active units. The endstate is a non-integrated and more flexible force, which is better situated to serve the requirements of both Services . Although the total strike force numbers are slightly higher 1164 vs 1140 the cost will be recouped with of the reduction of one CVW. In addition to reducing two F/A-18 E/F squadrons and the associated overhead aircraft, other CVW aircraft could also be reduced; 4 EA-6B, 4 E-2C, 4 S-3B and 8 H60s. 
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